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doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2012.03.020Range et al. (2007) provided the ﬁrst evidence that animals
imitate in an inferential, selective manner. Rather than emulating by
using their preferred method or (blindly) copying an alternative
method that a conspeciﬁc demonstrated to solve an instrumental
task, dogs selectively re-enacted the demonstrated action depending
on the constraints of the situation of the demonstrator. When the
model demonstrated a paw action instead of the usually preferred
mouth action, observer dogs imitated the paw action only if the
demonstrator did not have an obvious reason to do so (i.e. nothing
prevented her from using the mouth). However, when the model
demonstrated the paw action with her mouth ‘occupied’ (carrying
a ball), the observer dogs predominantly used the mouth. The
authors interpreted these results in terms of dogs being sensitive to
the efﬁciency of goal-directed actions. Before this study, this sensi-
tivity was considered a human-speciﬁc feature of cultural learning.
Of course, alternative interpretations of the study are possible.
For instance, the dogs may have acted differentially across condi-
tions based on the presence or absence of the ball. The mere
presence of a ball may affect the observers’ behaviour by distracting
them or by priming their tendency to grasp objects with theirarative Cognition, Messerli
Vienna, Medical University of
ienna, Austria.
Huber).
nimal Behaviour. Published by Elsmouth. Range et al. (2007) have acknowledged this, but on the basis
of various behavioural measurements they considered it very
unlikely. A recent study by Kaminski et al. (2011) set out to replicate
the experiment of Range et al. (2007) and to control directly for the
effect of the presence of the ball. The study failed to show selective
imitation in dogs, questioning the conclusion of the Range et al.
(2007) paper. In our opinion, however, this attempt at replication
is invalid because important elements of the procedure, the anal-
ysis and the statistics, as well as the interpretational assumptions,
differed between the two studies. This article summarizes and
explains these important differences.DIFFERENCES IN PROCEDURE AND ANALYSIS
Multiple differences in the procedure make comparisons across
the two studies difﬁcult. Kaminski et al. (2011) acknowledged the
possibility that the criteria for the inclusion of dogs in their study
were stricter, which may have led to a higher drop-out rate.
Therefore the pretraining was extended, with both actions being
extensively trained, which then may have led to the convergence in
the probability of usage of mouth and paw to operate the rod. A
further important difference was in the analysis of the test
performance. It is a common feature of imitation studies that
emphasis is laid on the performance in the ﬁrst trial after obser-
vation. Only initial, spontaneous performance can tell us how theevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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nessing a demonstration. To be fully comparable to Gergely et al.’s
(2002) study on children, our original study determined the
proportion of dogs using the demonstrated action (the paw action)
to manipulate the rod in the different groups in the ﬁrst trial (see
Table 2 in Range et al. 2007). In contrast, Kaminski et al. (2011) used
the ﬁrst successful action as the critical variable, irrespective of
whether it appeared in the ﬁrst or a subsequent trial.
When an action appears later, however, it is clearly possible that
the subject has learned from the previous attempts and so the
observational effect was overshadowed by trial-and-error learning.
Evenmore importantly, it appears that Kaminski et al. (2011) used
inappropriate statistics. To test for an inﬂuence of multiple predictor
variables on one response variable, they used multiple simple tests
(Fisher tests, t tests) instead of one overall model (analysis of variance
or a generalized linear model, GLM). First, they tested for the effect of
demonstration and found no (strong) effect (P¼ 0.128). Then they
used the same data and tested for the effect of the presence of the
ball. Here, they found a signiﬁcant effect (P¼ 0.029). However, if one
uses, more appropriately we believe, a binomial GLMmodel with the
method used in the ﬁrst successful attempt (Paw/Mouth) as a binary
response variable and Demonstration (Yes/No) and Ball presence
(Yes/No) as two predictor variables, Ball presence appears to have no
signiﬁcant effect when the effect of demonstration is held constant
(P¼ 0.12; data from Kaminski et al.’s Table 2). This means that, in
contrast to their main conclusion (page 200: ‘our ﬁndings suggest
that ball presence strongly affected dogs’ behaviour and thus may
explain Range et al.’s (2007) results’), Kaminski et al.’s own results do
not support this argument.
INTERPRETATION OF DATA
Kaminski et al. (2011) concluded that their results suggest that
dogs do not distinguish rational from irrational actions, rejecting
the conclusion imputed to our original study. They correctly note
that the seminal study with human children (Gergely et al. 2002)
has been interpreted as evidence that children from an early age
evaluate the ‘rationality’ of others’ actions. Furthermore, they refer
to studies with enculturated chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, con-
ducted in their own laboratory (Buttelmann et al. 2007, 2008) by
also suggesting that chimpanzees are able to interpret the rational
dimension of others’ actions. In these papers the authors claimed
that chimpanzees imitate rationally (Buttelmann et al. 2007) and
use tools rationally (Buttelmann et al. 2008). By then making
reference to Range et al. (2007) they characterized our study as
ﬁnding that ‘dogs copy others’ means to achieve a goal more often
when those means are the rational solution to a problem than
when they are irrational’ (Kaminski et al. 2011, page 195). However,
we, the authors of the cited study, have purposefully never used the
attribute ‘rational’ in our paper when interpreting the dogs’
behaviour. Instead, we concluded that the clear divergence in the
performance of the two experimental groups suggests an ability to
imitate ‘selectively’. As explained in more detail in Huber et al.
(2009; not cited in the article), these results ﬁt into a larger view
of how animals copy behaviour that varies according to the
matching ﬁdelity and types of re-enactment in social learning.
Kaminski et al. (2011) not only failed to acknowledge this impor-
tant difference in the interpretation of human children and chim-
panzee studies on the one hand and our dog study on the other (as
well as other selective imitation studies, such as Horner & Whiten
2005), but also failed to appreciate the reason for using the attribute
‘rational’ in Gergely et al.’s (2002) paper. As laid out in much more
detail by Gergely & Csibra (2003; not cited), teleological reasoning in
infancy can be framed in terms of a ‘naive theory of rational action’
insofar as in humans this nonmentalistic teleological interpretationalsystem of infants is related to a fully ﬂedgedmentalistic stance. Since
teleological reasoning is computationally easier than inferring and
attributing beliefs, desires and intentions to the actor’s mind, it also
might be available for nonhuman animals. Still, we may want to
differentiate its nonhuman forms from humans’ teleological
reasoning that is linked to a ‘mentalistic stance’, especially if there is
no other evidence that the nonhuman species is capable of
mentalizing.
Range et al. (2007) clearly stated (in the opening paragraph of
our paper) that the ability to predict the most efﬁcient action to
achieve a goal within the constraints of a given situation does not
require the attribution of mental states to others, but may rely
simply on the evaluation of observable facts: the action, the goal
state and the situational constraints. We further emphasized that
dogs, like other animal species, optimize their behaviour on the
basis of efﬁciency, for instance choosing the shorter route instead of
a detour to reach a reward (Pongracz et al. 2003). Thus, the aim of
the study was to examine whether dogs automatically copy
a demonstrated action (in whatever situation) or selectively re-
enact the demonstrated action depending on the constraints of
the situation. We did not claim, and do not believe, that our study
demonstrated ‘rational imitation’.
DIFFERENCE IN BASELINE DATA
The principle of action efﬁciency is likely to manifest at the
behavioural level as a preference of most subjects to use one
method over another formed by action selection during the course
of evolutionary or learning processes. The selective imitation task
crucially rests on the assumption that a nonpreferred or peculiar
action is copied (imitated) only in a causally opaque situation, that
is no constraints were present to explain the demonstrator’s inef-
fective choice. If the observer understands how to solve the task
(and achieve the desired goal), and the demonstrated action is not
justiﬁed by the constraints of the situation, he/she would rather
emulate by using their own preferred method to achieve the goal in
the easiest way. A test for selective imitation thus requires that
observers have two (or more) actions, with clearly different pref-
erences, at their disposal. Although Kaminski et al. (2011)
attempted to replicate our ﬁndings, the performance of the dogs
in their control group clearly failed to fulﬁl this conceptual
requirement. While the dogs in Range et al.’s study had a signiﬁcant
preference for the mouth action (84.6%), dogs in Kaminski et al.’s
study chose randomly between the two actions, showing, if at all,
a reversed tendency (37.5%) resulting from a slight preference for
the paw action. This difference between the control groups is
curious, but needs to be explained, not overlooked. This signiﬁcant
difference between the two studies renders a comparison with the
other (experimental) groups invalid, because one cannot test
whether observers give up a preference (because of a demonstra-
tion), if there is no clear preference in the control sample. Kaminski
et al.’s results raise the question of whether the preference for the
mouth is a robust phenomenon or is susceptible to procedural
differences (e.g. stronger pretraining as discussed by Kaminski
et al.). But this core difference between the two samples does not
render our conclusion about selective imitation invalid.
PRIMING VERSUS SELECTIVE IMITATION
Altogether, it seems that the goal of Kaminski et al.’s study, to test
the ‘distractor hypothesis’, that is whether a ball near the demon-
strator’s head has distracted the observer’s attention away from the
situational constraints of the demonstrator and has instead ‘primed’
the observer’s tendency to grasp things with their mouth, could not
be reached because of theoretical, methodological and statistical
L. Huber et al. / Animal Behaviour 83 (2012) e1ee3 e3problems. Although we agree that inclusion of such a control
condition is worthwhile in studies about action understanding and
efﬁciency-driven imitation/emulation, we do not think that priming
could account for our original results. Note that both experimental
groups used their mouth in the ﬁrst attempts to manipulate the rod
(Range et al. 2007, page 870), but many more subjects in the Mouth
Free condition than in the Mouth Occupied condition used only the
mouth. The critical elevation in the selective imitation task occurred
for the demonstrated (paw) action in the Mouth Free condition,
when the model’s paw use was not justiﬁed by any constraints on
using the mouth.
In conclusion, we are not surprised that Kaminski et al. (2011)
failed to replicate the ﬁndings of Range et al. (2007). Whether the
ﬁndings of Range et al. (2007), that dogs are able to choose selec-
tively whether to imitate or emulate a demonstrated transitive
action, are robust and can be extended to a broader dog population
or different experimental approaches remains an open question and
requires further experimentation. We are pleased that Kaminski and
colleagues found our results of such interest, and appreciate several
valuable innovations of their similar study. But the many differences
in methodology, analysis and interpretation in their study invalidate
it as an attempt at replicating our original study.
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